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Codes Identifying Bad Signatures in BathesJaros law Pastuszak1, Josef Pieprzyk2, and Jennifer Seberry21 Systems Researh InstitutePolish Aademy of SienesWarsaw, POLANDjarek.pastuszakbsb.om.pl2 Centre for Computer Seurity ResearhShool of IT and Computer SieneUniversity of WollongongWollongong, NSW 2522, AUSTRALIAJosef Pieprzykuow.edu.auJennifer Seberryuow.edu.auAbstrat. The work is onerned with identiation of bad signaturesin a sequene whih is validated using bathing. Identiation odes (id-odes) are dened and their general properties are investigated. A tax-onomy of id-odes is given. The generi onstrution for a wide range ofid-odes is given and its instantiation using mutually orthogonal Latinsquares is desribed. Hierarhial identiation is studied for two aseswhen the identiation proedure uses a family of id-odes and whenthere is a single underlying id-ode. Remarks about future researh on-lude the work.Keywords: Digital Signatures, Bath Veriation, Identiation Codes.1 IntrodutionThe onept of digital signatures have evolved onsiderably over the last twodeades. Handwritten signatures are not suitable in eletroni environment es-peially in the ontext of the ease in whih eletroni douments an be opiedand/or ut-and-paste manipulated. Digital signature were invented to preventdouments from illegal modiation. Digital signature enapsulates both theontents of the doument and the signer seret key in suh a way that veria-tion is publi - every body who knows the orresponding publi key of the signerand the doument, an validate the signature. Digital money is a spei kind ofsignature whih is signed (typially, blindly) by the bank and used by ustomersin (almost) the same way as the traditional ash with added important fun-tionality { it an be used in transations performed over the Internet (eletroniommere).The reliane of e-Commere on digital money has a dramati impat on theomputing load imposed on the bank. The bank has beome the foal point
where all eletroni money (digital signatures) are owing. Observe that be-fore the transation is approved, the eletroni money must be validated. Bathveriation is an attrative short ut for signature validation saving time andomputing resoures. It is appliable whenever the verier gets a large number ofdigital signatures generated by the same signer provided the signature exhibitsthe homomorphi property allowing signatures to be validated in bathes in theexpense of a single exponentiation.If the bath passes the validation, all signatures are onsidered orret and areaepted. If however, the bath fails to pass the validation test, the verier mustidentify invalid signatures in the bath. Clearly, rejetion of the whole bath isnot an option. A natural question arises: how to identify invalid signatures in thebath so the valid signatures an be aepted ? Additionally, one would expetthat the identiation proess should be as eÆient as possible.2 BakgroundBath veriation makes sense if the signatures in a bath are related or gener-ated by the same signer. There are two types of signatures whih an be bathed:RSA signatures and DSA (DSS) signatures. The RSA signatures use the xedexponent (publi key of the signer) for veriation. Assume that we have n mes-sages and their signatures. The signatures an be veried independently at theexpense of n exponentiations. The bath ontaining all signature an be veriedat the expense of a single exponentiation plus (n  1) modular multipliations.DSA signatures are based on exponentiation when the base is xed and pub-lily known (the modular arithmetis is hosen by the signer). Again n signaturesan be veried one by one at the expense of n exponentiations. The bath ofn signatures are validated using a single exponentiation and (n   1) modularadditions.These two methods of bath veriation are inseure as an enemy who mayknow the veriation proess, may try to get the verier to aept invalid sig-natures. The simplest method of attak would be to produe a forged signatureand insert two opies of it in the bath in suh a way that they anel eahother when the veriation is performed, For instane in the RSA ase, anybath whih ontains two forged pairs: (mf ; sf ) and (m 1f ; s 1f ) where mf is theforged message (doument) and sf is the forged signature, passes the veriationtest.Bellare, Garay and Rabin [1℄ developed veriation tests whih are seureagainst any attaker. The seurity of the test is measured by the probabilitythat a ontaminated bath passes it making the verier to aept all invalid orbad signatures ontained in the bath. The probability of slipping bad signaturesthrough the test an be traded with eÆieny.The problem we address in this work is an eÆient identiation of bad signa-tures after the test fails. There is a general method of bad signature identiationwhih is alled \ut and hoose" in [3℄ or \divide and onquer" in [4℄. It takes aontaminated bath and splits it repeatedly until all bad signatures are identi-
ed. The eÆieny of this method depends on the degree of ontamination (orhow many bad signatures are in the bath) and also on how the bad signaturesare distributed in the bath.Note that identiation of bad signatures resembles the problem of error or-retion. To be able to orret errors, the ode must learly identify all positionson whih errors have ourred. As observed in [4℄, error orreting odes an beappliable for bad signature identiation. There is a major dierene betweenerror orreting odes and identiation odes or id-odes whih allow to identifybad signatures. Computations in error orreting odes are done in the binaryeld with EXCLUSIVE-OR addition (XOR). The interation among valid andinvalid signatures within the bath are governed by INCLUSIVE-OR (logialOR).The work is strutured as follows. The model for id-odes is studied in Se-tion 3. Setion 4 investigates general properties of id-odes. Setion 5 disussestaxonomy of id-odes. The general onstrution based on OR-heking matrixand its instantiation based on mutually orthogonal Latin squares are given inSetion 6. Hierarhial identiation is desribed in Setion 7. A disussion aboutfurther work on id-odes loses the work.3 The ModelThe problem we are dealing with is bad signature identiation in a bath whihhas failed to pass the test. The test T is a probabilisti algorithm whih takesa bath of an arbitrary length and produes a binary outome aept/rejet. Itsatises the following two general onditions:1. Any lean bath (whih ontains all valid signatures) always passes the test.2. A dirty bath (whih ontains one or more bad signatures) fails the test withan overwhelming probability. In fat, it is reasonable to assume that a dirtybath always fails the test.We further suppose that the ost of running the test does not depend on thesize of the bath. This assumption seems to be true for relatively small batheswhere the omputation eort is equivalent to a xed sequene of exponentiations(see [1℄).Denition 1. Given a bath Bu = f(mi; si)ji = 1; : : : ; ug of signed douments(mi is the i-th doument and si its signature). The identiation ode IC(u; t)able to identify up to t bad signatures is a olletion of sub-bathes (B1; : : : ;Bv)where Bi  Bu suh that for any possible pattern of up to t bad signatures, theoutomes (the syndrome) S = (T (B1); : : : ; T (Bv))uniquely identies all bad signatures.
The identiation ode IC(u; t) an be equivalently represented by its v  utest-heking matrix A = [aij ℄ suh thataij = 1 if (mi; si) 2 Bj0 otherwiseClearly, for a xed size u of the bath, one would like to obtain a ode IC(u; t)with the parameter v as small as possible. Note that v indiates how many testsT must be run to identify all bad signatures and it an be onsidered as theparameter haraterising the eÆieny of the ode. The parameter v is upperbounded by u as it is always possible to design a trivial ode whose matrix A isthe uu identity matrix. This ode is equivalent to serial validation of signaturesone by one.The following notation is introdued. The ode IC(u; t) is uniquely identiedby its (v  u) test-heking matrix A. The entries of A are binary. Columns ofthe matrix A are indexed by u signatures in a bath. So the matrix A an beseen as a sequene of olumns of the formA = (A1; : : : ; Au)The index of the i-th signature in the bath Bu is the i-th olumn Ai. A rowspeies the orresponding sub-bath whih inludes all signatures for whih theentries are 1.Note that if the i-th signature is bad the syndrome produed for a bathontaminated by it is equal to Ai or S(i) = Ai. Given a bath Bu with t badsignatures. Assume further that the bad signatures have ourred on positions(b1; : : : ; bt) in the bath Bu. Their orresponding indies are (Ab1 ; : : : ; Abt). De-note the syndrome produed for the bath asS(b1; : : : ; bt) = Ab1 _ : : : _ Abtwhere _ is bit-by-bit inlusive (logial) OR. For example, ifA1 = 266411003775 and A2 = 266410103775 then A1 _ A2 = 266411103775 :4 Properties of Id-CodesUsing an information-theoreti arguments, we argue that there is a lower boundon the v parameter.Theorem 1. Given an id-ode IC(u; t) whih always identies orretly any tbad signatures in the bath of the size u. Then the number of tests (and thenumber of olletions) v satises the following inequalityv  log2 tXi=0 ui  (1)
Proof. Given a bath Bu of u elements ontaminated by at most t bad signatures.The identiation of bad signatures is possible if the syndromes are distint forall patterns of i bad signatures (i  t) so knowing the syndrome, it is possibleto determine the positions of bad signatures in the bath. Note that there aretXi=0 ui dierent identiable patterns (inluding the pattern with no bad signature). Nowif we have v sub-bathes (B1; : : : ;Bv), then the test T applied for a single sub-bath Bj ; 0  j  t, provides a binary outome (pass/fail) so the number ofpossible syndromes is 2v. Clearly2v  tXi=0 ui and the bound desribed by Equation (1) holds.Obviously, searhing for id-odes makes sense if they are better (take lesstests) than the naive id-ode whih tests bathes ontaining single signatures.From Theorem 1 we an derive an interesting orollary.Corollary 1. Id-odes better than the naive id-ode exist only if t < u=2.Proof. Note that for t  n=2, the number of tests2v  tXi=0 ui   u=2Xi=0 ui   12 uXi=0 ui  = 2u 1Thus the number of tests v must be at least u  1 whih is almost the same asfor the naive id-ode whih requires u tests.Denition 2. An index Ai inludes Aj if Ai _Aj = Ai.Given the matrix A of an id-ode. Observe that if there are two olumns i 6= jsuh that the index Ai inludes Aj , then the ode is unable to identify whetherthere are a single bad signature with the syndrome Ai or two bad signatureswith the syndrome Ai _ Aj . In other words, the matrix A with suh indies isnot able to identify bad signatures with indies Aj and Ai. We say that the twoindies ollide.Lemma 1. Given identiation oding with a (v  u) test-heking matrix A.Assume further that there is an index Ai (olumn Ai) suh that its Hammingweight wt(Ai) = r, then the number of olliding indies with Ai isC#(Ai) = 2r + 2v r   2:Proof. There are two ases where ollision may our
{ the index Ai inludes other indies (Ai _ Ak = Ai) for some k,{ the index Ai is inluded in other indies (Ai _ Ak = Ak).For a given index Ai with its Hamming weight r, we an reate 2r   1 indieswhih are inluded in Ai { the rst ase. We an also reate 2v r   1 indieswhih inlude Ai { the seond ase. In eet, we have to exlude 2r + 2v r   2indies.Corollary 2. To inrease eetiveness of identiation odes we should seletweights of indies so the number of olliding indies is minimal. The smallestnumber of olliding indies ours when the Hamming weight of all indies is v2 .Assume that we have two indies Ai and Aj . We an dene the intersetionof the two as Ai ^Aj where ^ is bit-by-bit logial AND.Lemma 2. Given two indies Ai and Aj suh that wt(Ai) = r1 and wt(Aj) =r2. Denote A = Ai ^ Aj { the maximal index whih is ontained in both Aiand Aj and wt(A) = r. Then the number of indies whih ollide with the pair(Ai; Aj) isC#(Ai; Aj) = 2v r1 + 2v r2 + 2r1+r2 r   2v+r r1 r2   2r1 r   2r2 r:Proof. Denote A = fA1; : : : ; Aug. Note that C#(Ai; Aj)  C#(Ai _ Aj) andbeomes the equality only if r = 0. From Lemma 1, we an writeC#(Ai _ Aj) = 2r1+r2 r + 2v+r r1 r2   2:Denote #Ai and #Aj the numbers of olliding indies from Ai and Aj , respe-tively, whih have not been onsidered among the indies from Ai _ Aj . Thus,we have C#(Ai; Aj) = C#(Ai _Aj) + #Ai + #Aj :There are the following ases, the index{ ollides with Ai { there are 2r1 suh indies,{ ollides with Aj nAi { there are 2r2 r suh indies,{ ollides with A n (Ai ^Aj) { there are 2v+r r1 r2 suh indies.Observe that indies olliding with Aj nAi have been already ounted in C#(Ai_Aj). Further on, note that the zero index (all bits are zero) has been ounted.Therefore#Ai = (2r2 r   1)(2v+r r1 r2   1) and #Aj = (2r1 r   1)(2v+r r1 r2   1):Adding the numbers we obtain the nal result.Lemma 3. Given identiation ode determined by its (vu) matrix A. If thereis a parameter k  u and a sequene of indies (Ai1 ; : : : ; Aik ) suh thatk_j=1Aij = 2641...1375 def= 1v;
then the id-ode an identify no more than k bad signatures. Where Wkj=1 standsfor bit-by-bit logial OR and 1v is a binary vetor of length v ontaining onesonly.Proof. Denote A = fA1; : : : ; Aug as the set of all indies (olumns) of the matrixA. Create the following two sets:A1 = fAi1 ; : : : ; Aikg and A2 = A nA1:The proof proeeds by ontradition. Assume that any t = k + 1 bad signaturesan be identied. Now we take a sequene of k bad signatures with their indies(Ai1 ; : : : ; Aik ). Their syndrome is 1v. Now if there is an extra bad signature thanthe olletion of t bad signatures have the same syndrome { there is a ollisionand we have obtained the ontradition.Observe that while designing id-odes, one would need to avoid using twoindies Ai, Aj suh that Ai = :Aj where : is bit-by-bit negation as suh id-ode identies at most two bad signatures.5 Taxonomy of Id-CodesFrom an eÆieny point of view, the bath size is preferred to be as large aspossible. This also means that the size of the bath determines the blok size ofthe id-ode. So to identify bad signatures eÆiently, one would need a family ofid-odes rather than a single id-ode working for a bath of xed size. On theother hand, there is a boundary on the blok size of a id-ode whih typiallyreets restritions imposed on omputing resoures.Given a bath Bn and an id-ode IC(u; t) There are two general lasses ofbad signature identiation:{ at identiation { there is an id-ode whose blok size equals the size of thebath (n = u),{ hierarhial identiation { the number of signatures u in the bath is biggerthan the blok size u (n > u).Clearly, at identiation applies an id-ode and if the number of bad signaturesis smaller than t, it always works. Its natural extension for larger bath sizes,ould be the division of the bath into sub-bathes eah of size u. Hierarhialidentiation applies merges signatures into sub-bathes and treats them as sin-gle signatures so we get a sequene of u sub-bathes. The ode is applied to itand identies up to t ontaminated sub-bathes. These sub-bathes an be eithersubjet to at or again to hierarhial identiation.Assume that the eÆieny of identiation is measured by the number oftests T neessary to identify all bad signatures. Note that this measurement isequivalent to the number of rows in the matrix A whih denes the id-ode.Intuitively, the more bad signatures are in a bath, the more expensive theidentiation proess is. Id-ode an be ategorised into:
{ odes with onstant workload { no matter what is the degree of ontami-nation, the number of tests is onstant and the ode either sueeds (if theidentiation apability exeeds the degree of ontamination) or fails,{ odes with ontamination-dependent workload { the number of tests dependson the ontamination. Again odes fail if the number of bad signatures ex-eeds their identiation apabilities.From a pratial point of view, odes with ontamination-dependent workloadare very attrative as they trade eÆieny with identiation apability. Theidentiation proess starts by performing a limited number of tests allowing toidentify a single bad signature. If this fails, the identiation proeeds by trying anew tests whih together with the old tests permit to identify two bad signatures.The proess ontinues until all bad signatures are identied or the identiationfails. Important feature of id-odes seems to be re-usability of previous tests.The bath validation applies a spei id-ode, say IC(u; t). If the apabilityof the ode (expressed by t) is smaller than the degree of bath ontamination `(` is the number of bad signatures in the bath), then the failure is unavoidable.Consequently, the parameter t must be inreased. Additionally, the work doneso far is likely to be lost. Thus it is imperative, to make a \good" guess aboutthe maximum degree of ontamination (the parameter t). Clearly, statistialinformation gathered from the past an suggest suh a guess. Note that the situ-ation simplies somewhat if the odes in hand trade eÆieny with identiationapability as the guess an be more pessimisti.6 Construtions of Id-CodesAs we know, one would wish to have an identiation ode whih allows forgradual inrement of t with a possible re-use of all tests onduted for smallerts. Now we present our main onstrution.Denition 3. A (k+ 1)nn2 matrix A with binary elements is a OR-hekingmatrix if there are k+ 1 ones per olumn, n ones per row, and the inner produtof any pair of olumns is either zero or one.Lemma 4. Given a (k + 1)n n2 OR-heking matrix A. Then the OR of anysubset of k olumns is unique for k = 1; : : : ; n  1.Proof. For onveniene in typesetting we will write these olumns as rows bytransposing the matrix { so we are going to onsider AT . We onsider any krows but permute them so that the ones are moved to the left of eah row asfar as possible. We now onsider a simple ounting argument to look at theintersetion patters of the rows. If any two rows have an intersetion +1, theones (written as x) will use a total of 12 (k + 1)(k + 2)  1 olumns and be ableto be represented as:k+1 k k-1 ... | 2x x x ... x 0 0 ... 0 0 ... 0 ... |00
x 0 0 ... 0 x x ... x 0 ... 0 ... |000 x 0 ... 0 x 0 ... 0 x ... x ... |00...0 0 0 ... x 0 0 ... x 0 ... x ... |xxIf any pair of rows do not have intersetion +1 then more than 12 (k + 1)(k +2)  1 olumns will be needed to represent the patters of ones but the last rowwill always have at least 2 elements +1 at the right of the row whih have noelement in the olumn above either of them whih is non-zero.Now suppose that the matrix yielded that any k   1 rows orresponding tobad signatures gave a unique OR but that there are two solutions whih give thesame result for k rows indiating bad signatures. We rearrange the rows in ourpattern representative, if neessary, so one of these two solutions is the last row.We now onsider the other solution. For the rst k   1 vetors and the seondsolution to over the same number of olumns the seond solution must have two+1 at the right of the row whih have no element in the olumn above either ofthem non-zero. But this means the rst and seond solution have at intersetionat least 2 ones ontraditing the denition of the OR-heking matrix. Heneany olletion of k rows produes OR sums whih are distint.We note that this proof does not extend to a olletion of k+ 1 rows beausein that ase we ould only assume the last row to have more than one elements+1 at the right of the last row whih has no element in the olumn above itwhih is non-zero. This does not lead to any ontradition.Corollary 3. Given a (k + 1)n  n2 OR-heking matrix A whose every twoolumn intersetion is either zero or one. Then there is an IC(u; t) ode whihis apable to identify up to t = n 1 bad signatures within a bath of size u = n2.The identiation ode based on OR-heking matries is eÆient as it allowsto re-use all previous results if the guess about the parameter t has been wrong.Given a bath Bu of the size u = n2. The (n  u) OR-heking matrix A isreated. Denote A(t) as a shortened version of A ontaining rst (t + 1)n rowsof A; t = 1; 2; : : : ; n  1.1. The identiation proess starts from the assumption that t = 1. First ol-letion of 2n tests T are run for bathes dened by rows of the matrix A(1).If the bad signatures are not orretly identied (i.e. the bath without badsignatures still fails the test T ), then it is assumed that t = 2. Otherwise theproess ends.2. Assume that the identiation using A(t) has failed to identify bad signatures(t = 2; 3; : : : ; n  1). The olletion of neessary tests are dened by A(t+1).Note that A(t+1) diers from A(t) in that it ontains n additional rows. Theidentiation proess an be aomplished by running n additional testsorresponding to the bathes dened by rows in A(t+1) whih are not inA(t). If the identiation has not been suessful, t is inrement by 1 and theproess ontinues.
The identiation fails if t  n.The onstrution also gives the upper bound on the number v of neessarytests to identify t bad signatures.Corollary 4. The number v of tests neessary to identify t bad signatures inthe bath of size u satises the following inequality:v  (t + 1)puThere are many ombinatorial strutures whih an be used to give the re-quired OR-heking matries for example transversal designs and group divisibledesigns. However we give a rih onstrution based on Latin squares.A Latin square of order n is an nn array in whih n dierent symbols, saya, b, : : : eah our one in eah row and olumn. Two Latin squares are said tothe mutually orthogonal if when the squares are ompared element by elementeah of the distint pairs ours exatly one. Formally, two Latin squares, L andL0 are said to be mutually orthogonal if L(a; b) = L(; d) and L0(a; b) = L0(; d),implies a =  and b = d. For further information, refer to [2℄.Lemma 5. Suppose there are k mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order n.Then there is a (k + 1)n n2 OR-heking matrix.Proof. We use the auxiliary matries desribed in [2℄.Example 1. LetM1 = 264 a b  db a d  d a bd  b a375 ; M2 = 264 a b  d d a bd  b ab a d 375 ; M3 = 264 a b  dd  b ab a d  d a b375be three mutually orthogonal Latin squares of order 4 on the symbols x1 = a,x2 = b, x3 =  and x4 = d. Dene Mij ; 1  i  k, by(Mij)ef = 1 (Mi)fj = xe;0 otherwise.where 1  e; f  4. So Mij ; 1  i  4 and 1  j  4 an be written as
1 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 11 1 1 1Corollary 5. Let q > 2 be a prime power then there are q  1 mutually orthog-onal Latin squares of order qMany other results are also known, for example for every n  3 exept 6there are at least two orthogonal Latin squares of order n and for n > 90 thereare at least 6.7 Hierarhial IdentiationIdentiation odes are designed to work with a bath of xed size. In pratie,one would expet to have an identiation sheme whih is going to work witha bath of arbitrary length. Hierarhial identiation provides suh a sheme.Consider a family of id-odes F = fIC(v; t)g with some well dened parameters(v; t).Denition 4. Given a bath Bu of arbitrary length u. Hierarhial identiationbased on the family of identiation odes F is a proedure dened reursively:{ stopping ase { if the size of the bath u is smaller or equal to some parameterv so we an use the identiation ode IC(v; t) 2 F , then we apply it (atidentiation), otherwise{ reursive step { if the size of the bath u is bigger than the highest parametervmax in the family F , then it is divided into ` sub-bathes suh that `  vmaxand there is some IC(v; t) 2 F whih an be used to identify ontaminatedsub-bathes where `  v and (t0  t).The hierarhial identiation is denoted by HI(F).Hierarhial identiation an be based on dierent olletions of id-odes.Thereare two extreme ases:
{ F onsists of innite sequene of id-odes,{ the family F is redued to a single id-ode.No matter what is the underlying family F , one would ask the followingquestions:{ What is the minimum (maximum, average) number of tests whih is nees-sary to identify all bad signatures ?{ Given a family F and the number t of bad signatures in the bath, is thereany proedure whih minimises the number of tests ?7.1 Hierarhial Identiation with Innite FConsider id-odes dened in Setion 6. Eah id-ode an be uniquely indexed bya prime power p > 2. For this index, the ode is IC(p2; p  1). The familyF = fIC(p2; p  1)jp is the prime power; p 6= 2gNote that IC(p2; p 1) an be used to identify up to p 1 bad signatures. If thenumber of bad signatures is t  p  1, the ode will use(t + 1)p + 1tests. If t > p  1, then the ode fails.Let #T (F) be the number of tests neessary to identify all t bad signaturesin a bath Bu. Now we are trying to evaluate lower and upper bound for thenumber #T (F). Assume that the size of the bath u = p2 where p is a primepower. Now we hoose somehow p1 < p and divide the bath Bu into p21 sub-bathes. Eah sub-bath ontains up21 elements. Note that we have to onsideronly odes for whih t > p1   1 as otherwise the ode may fail.Let the t bad signatures be lustered into r sub-bathes eah ontaining tibad signatures so t = rXi=1 tiwhere r  p1 1 and naturally, ti  up21 . The number #T (F) has two omponents:1. the number of tests neessary to identify all ontaminated sub-bathes { thistakes  = (r + 1)p1 + 1;2. the number of tests neessary to identify bad signatures within the sub-bathes. For a given sub-bath, we ount the number of neessary tests. Firstwe hoose a prime power p2 suh that p22  up21 . As the sub-bath ontains tibad signatures we need i = (ti + 1)p2 + 1tests.
The number of tests #T (F) =  + rXi=1 iwhih after simple transformations gives#T (F) = (r + 1)p1 + p2(t + r) + (r + 1)The number #T (F) depends on the random parameter r and grows linearlywith r so #T (F) is smallest for r = 1 when all bad signatures our in a singlesub-bath. #T (F) takes on the maximum for r = t = p1   1. So we have thefollowing orollary.Corollary 6. Given a bath Bu with t bad signatures. Hierarhial identiationwith innite F will onsume #T (F) tests where2p1 + (t + 1)p2 + 2  #T (F)  p21 + 2p1p2 + p1   2p2:7.2 Hierarhial Bathing with a Single IC(v; t)In some appliations, one would like to keep the identiation proedure assimple as possible whih is using a single identiation ode or in other wordsthe family F ontains a single element. Again, knowing the number t of badsignatures in a bath Bu, one would like to see how the number of neessarytests to identify all signatures varies (lower and upper bounds) as a funtion ofthe u and t.Assume that v = p2 and we apply the id-ode IC(p2; p   1). Given a bathBu. There are two ways bad signatures an be identied:{ Serial identiation { a bath is divided into up2 sub-bathes. For eah sub-bath, the id-ode is used. This is a serial appliation of at identiation.{ Hierarhial identiation { a bath is divided into v sub-bathes and theid-ode is applied for the sub-bathes and identies the ontaminated sub-bathes. The proess is repeated for ontaminated sub-bathes as many timesas neessary to identify bad signatures.Consider serial identiation. Note that if a bath Bp2 is lean (t = 0), ittakes one test to verify it. If the bath is ontaminated by t < p bad signatures,the identiation will take (t + 1)p + t + 1 tests. Assume that a bath Bu hasbeen divided into R = up2 sub-bathes (if u is a multiple of p2) among whihr sub-bathes are dirty and the other R   r are lean. All lean sub-bathesonsume one test eah. A dirty sub-bath Bi takes (ti + 1)(p + 1) tests wherePri=1 ti = t. So the number of tests required to identify bad signatures isup2   r + (p + 1)(t + r)Note that the number of tests is a random variable whih ranges from r = 1when all bad signatures happen to be in one sub-bath, to r = t when there aret sub-bathes eah ontaining a single bad signature.
Consider the seond ase of hierarhial identiation. To simplify our delib-erations, assume that u = p2j for some integer j. Denote #T (j; t) the numberof tests needed to identify t bad signatures in a bath Bp2j when the id-odeis applied to the sub-bathes eah ontaining p2(j 1) signatures. The followingreursive equation is easy to derive#T (j; t) = (r + 1)p + r + rXi=1 #T (j   1; ti);where r is a random variable whih indiates the number of ontaminated sub-bathes and ti are numbers of bad signatures in the orresponding ontaminatedsub-bathes; i = 1; : : : ; r.8 ConlusionsThe generi lass of id-odes has been dened using the test-heking matrix A.The (uv) matrix A determines the neessary tests. The syndrome is the binaryvetor whih gives the test results for sub-bathes dened by rows of A. Thesyndrome is also equal to bit-by-bit inlusive-OR of indies whih orrespond tobad signatures. We have investigated interation of indies and found out thatto maximise the identiation apability of an id-ode, one would need to hooseindies of their Hamming weight equal to v=2.The main onstrution of id-odes uses the so-alled OR-heking matrix.The id-ode takes a sequene of n2 signatures and allows to identify up to n  1bad signatures. The nie harateristi of the ode is that the number of testsan be redued if the bath ontains less than n 1 bad signatures. To identify asingle bad signature, it takes 2n tests. Any additional bad signature, adds n ad-ditional tests neessary for orret identiation. There are many ombinatorialstrutures whih an be used to design id-odes. We have shown how mutuallyorthogonal Latin squares an be applied to onstrut id-odes.We have not disussed the identiation proedure of bad signatures in ourid-ode. The problem is far less ompliated than for example in error orretingodes, mainly beause the monotoniity of the Hamming weight of the syndrome.In other words, indies of bad signatures must be inluded in the syndrome. Theimplementation of this proess an be done by{ heking all signatures one by one and marking those whose index ollideswith the syndrome,{ removing all signatures belonging to those sub-bathes whih have passedthe test (they identied by zeros in the syndrome). In other words, all badsignatures are in the set B n [T (Bi)=0Biwhere Bi is the sub-bath determined by the i-th row of the id-ode.
Id-odes an be used diretly to a ontaminated bath. We alled this atidentiation. Alternatively, a ontaminated bath an be rst grouped into sub-bathes and the id-ode is applied to sub-bathes and identies ontaminatedsub-bathes. This proess an be done many times until bad signatures are iden-tied. This is the hierarhial identiation.There are still many open problems. The obvious one is whether the on-strution given in this work is \optimal", i.e. identiation of bad signaturesonsumes the smallest possible number of tests. Hierarhial identiation al-lows to avoid natural limitations imposed by the size of bath and apply theid-ode in hand to a bath of arbitrary length. Is there any strategy for groupingsignatures into sub-bathes so the number of neessary tests is minimised ?Referen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